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AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY: OLD PRINCIPLES 
FOR AN (ALLEGEDLY) BRAVE NEW WORLD 
HARRY F. TEPKER
*
 
In times of turmoil, fear, and uncertainty, it is tempting to believe that 
our nation is suffering in an unprecedented way, even though history gives 
us many precedents and antecedents to underscore the old joke: “If history 
doesn’t repeat itself, it sure does rhyme.”1 Today’s Americans view our 
current plight—“this post-truth, alternative facts moment—as some 
inexplicable and crazy new American phenomenon. In fact, what’s 
happening is just the ultimate extrapolation and expression of attitudes and 
instincts that have made America exceptional for its entire history—and 
really from its prehistory.”2 Still, the nation is undergoing what might be 
described as a stress test: suspicions and investigations; a pattern of 
governmental lying; a pattern of political lying to gain power; overt and 
covert cultivation of haters, bigots, and the fearful; political polarization; a 
rising fear of authoritarian and autocratic patterns.
3
  
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law & Floyd and Irma Calvert Chair of Law and Liberty, the 
University of Oklahoma College of Law. This Essay is based on remarks on the First 
Amendment and Falsehood delivered at the 2018 Oklahoma Law Review Symposium on 
February 9, 2018. 
 1. The oft-used joke is attributed to Mark Twain, but like many quotations, it lacks 
verification. Brian Adams, History Doesn’t Repeat, but It Often Rhymes, HUFFPOST (Jan. 19, 
2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/brian-adams/history-doesnt-repeat-but-it-often-
rhymes_a_21657884/. 
 2. KURT ANDERSEN, FANTASYLAND: HOW AMERICA WENT HAYWIRE 11 (2017). 
 3. Inevitably, finger-pointing dominates and taints any too brief summary of our 
nation’s “stress test,” but we should not overlook the responsibility of the media, empowered 
by new and powerful technology. As summarized by commentator Franklin Foer: 
Donald Trump is the culmination of the era. He understood how, more than at 
any moment in recent history, media need to give the public what it wants, a 
circus that exploits subconscious tendencies and biases. Even if media 
disdained Trump’s outrages, they built him up as a character and a plausible 
candidate. For years, media pumped Trump’s theories about President Obama’s 
foreign birth into circulation, even though they were built on dunes of crap. It 
gave endless attention to his initial smears of immigrants, even though media 
surely understood how those provocations stoked an atmosphere of paranoia 
and hate. Once Trump became a plausible candidate, media had no choice but 
to cover him. But media had carried him to that point. Stories about Trump 
yielded the sort of traffic that pleased the Gods of Data and benefited the 
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The assigned mission for this Essay was historical background. But this 
Essay also offers a brief plea for an old faith in the face of new fears; or 
more precisely, a faith in old, settled principles that we dare not discard 
because we are passing through times of ideological and partisan conflict. It 
is far, far better if we laugh. “It is by the goodness of God that in our 
country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of 
speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice either of 
them.”4 So wrote Mark Twain.  
There have been many times in American history when citizens took 
solace in humor. Famously, the defeated presidential candidate Adlai 
Stevenson quoted a joke attributed to Abraham Lincoln: “I’m like the boy 
who stubbed his toe in the dark. I’m too old to cry and it hurts too much to 
laugh.”5 We must hope that most election defeats are like stubbed toes (no 
matter what we really think), but we should remember Oklahoma’s own 
Will Rogers: “On account of being a democracy and run by the people, we 
are the only nation in the world that has to keep a government four years, 
no matter what it does.”6  
These days it is hard to avoid laughing, painfully, even when consulting 
old wisdom. James Madison hoped, “Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance.”7 Reasonable citizens today might well doubt Mr. Madison’s 
powers of prophecy. And yet, who can deny Madison’s thinking? “[A] 
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the 
power knowledge gives.”8 “A popular Government, without popular 
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a 
                                                                                                                 
bottom line. Trump began as Cecil the Lion, and then ended up president of the 
United States. 
FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 149 
(2017). 
 4. MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR 195 (New York, Doubleday & McClure 
1897), https://archive.org/details/followingequator00twaiuoft. 
 5. Jena McGregor, Remembering a Speech from ‘The Most Beautiful Loser’ After 
Trump Won’t Commit to Accepting Results, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/10/20/remembering-a-speech-from-the-
most-beautiful-loser-after-trump-wont-commit-to-accepting-
results/?utm_term=.883217d2b447.  
 6. Quotes, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF WILL ROGERS, https://www.cmgww.com/historic/ 
rogers/about/photos/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2018).  
 7. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in Epilogue: Securing the 
Republic, FOUNDERS’ CONST., http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18 
s35.html (last visited May 23, 2018). 
 8. Id. 
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Tragedy, or, perhaps both.”9 The wit and wisdom are part of the traditions 
of our republic that require remembrance and defense, even when we lack 
confidence.  
Origins and Evolution: Beyond Blackstone to Madison’s Report 
History is essential preface. Constitutional debate usually begins with 
some sort of discussion that asks the question: What did the framers think 
about freedom of expression? When resisting a bill of rights on the theory 
that it would do little good, Alexander Hamilton asked a question that 
courts were forced to answer, though it took a century and a half to begin 
the interpretive process. “What signifies a declaration, that ‘the liberty of 
the press shall be inviolably preserved’? What is the liberty of the press? 
Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude 
for evasion?”10  
If you were a lawyer in 1776 or 1788 or 1798, there was not much 
doctrine to respond to Mr. Hamilton’s rhetorical question. A lawyer did not 
have much law to read, except Blackstone in his commentaries on the law 
of England. And there he gave what is probably the central beginning point 
of American doctrine defining free speech:
11
 there shall be no censorship or 
prior restraint; but there is no protection or immunity for dangerous or 
disruptive expression.
12
 So, we must understand that our liberty today is 
much broader, greater and more comprehensive than it was at the creation 
of our new republic. While the framers thought clearly and extensively 
about religious liberty,
13
 they didn’t do much thinking about freedom of 
expression.
14
  
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 11. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150–53. 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an 
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid 
this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, 
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. 
Id. 
 12. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY at ix (1960) (“I have been reluctantly forced to conclude that the 
generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not believe in a broad 
scope for freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics.”). 
 13. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments (June 20, 1785), in Amendment I (Religion), FOUNDERS' CONST., http://press-
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The best evidence of this was the enactment of the Sedition Act of 1798, 
signed into law by John Adams.
15
 The law declared that, if you criticize the 
government or the President or the Congress in a way that will bring them 
into public contempt, you will go to jail.
16
 If the law of the past applied 
today, you can imagine the number of people who could be going to jail: 
the entire cast of Saturday Night Live; Stephen Colbert; the staffs of CNN 
and MSNBC; and the author of this Essay, yours truly. Only the names 
would change if we took the measure of the President’s critics in 2013; one 
vulnerable celebrity who would suffer from enhanced punishment for 
alleged or proved lies damaging to the reputation of the incumbent 
President would have been the “birther-in-chief” himself.17  
When measuring the course of our nation’s history, we should be 
chastened to remember that Federalist federal courts upheld the Sedition 
Act of 1798: it was not prior restraint, and it embodied all of the elements 
of a modern liberal law, at least for the 1790s.
18
 The only progress was 
theoretical. Madison published a new libertarian theory of free speech, but 
at first it was only political propaganda to denounce the Adams 
administration.
19
 Still, Madison claimed the First Amendment goes beyond 
                                                                                                                 
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html (last visited May 18, 
2018).  
 14. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS xii (1985) [hereinafter LEVY, 
EMERGENCE] (“[T]he theory of freedom of political expression remained quite narrow until 
1798. . . . The revolutionary generation did not seek to wipe out the core idea of seditious 
libel, that government may be criminally assaulted by mere words . . . .”). 
 15. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.  
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 417, 424 (“Donald Trump is a pure 
fantasyland being, its apotheosis . . . . Trump launched his political career by embracing a 
brand-new conspiracy theory twisted around to other deep American taproots—fear and 
loathing of foreigners and nonwhites. In 2011 Trump became chief spokesperson for the 
fantasy that President Barack Obama was born in Kenya, a fringe idea that he brought into 
the mainstream.”); KATY TUR, UNBELIEVABLE 222–24 (2017) (“You remember that, right? 
Trump’s one-man crusade to prove, without evidence, that the first African American 
president was illegitimate because he was born in Kenya . . . . [I]t’s not as though Trump had 
apologized for the birtherism . . . . But instead of apologizing, he kept lying.”). 
 18. LEVY, EMERGENCE, supra note 14, at 202–03 (stating that the sponsors and authors 
of the statute “acted in full consistency with [their] opinions expressed . . . [that] falsehoods 
and scandals against the government should be punished ‘with becoming rigour.’ . . . Why, 
asked [Justice] Cushing, need an honest man ‘be afraid of truth? The guilty only fear it.’”). 
 19. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in Amendment I 
(Speech and Press), FOUNDERS' CONST., http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ 
documents/amendI_speechs24.html (last visited May 18, 2018) [hereinafter Report on the 
Virginia Resolutions]. 
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Blackstone’s prior restraint principle: “It would seem a mockery to say that 
no laws should be passed preventing publications from being made, but that 
laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should be made.”20 
He claimed that free speech must exist for the sake of progress of the nation 
and western civilization: “[C]an the wisdom of this policy be doubted by 
any who reflect that to the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the 
world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason 
and humanity over error and oppression . . . .”21 Though law and doctrine 
might not have evolved, the nation owed a great debt to the actualities of a 
functioning free press: “Had ‘Sedition Acts’ . . . been uniformly enforced 
against the press, might not the United States have been languishing at this 
day under the infirmities of a sickly Confederation? Might they not, 
possibly, be miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke?”22 
Madison also argued that “truth as a defense,” explicitly embodied in the 
Sedition Act, was not enough to guarantee the benefits of free expression: 
“[O]pinions . . . may often be more the objects of the prosecution than the 
facts themselves . . . .”23 Madison’s Report also began a long tradition of 
defending free expression for the sake of democracy. After all, the people’s 
right to choose their leaders “depends on the knowledge of the comparative 
merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal 
freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and 
demerits of the candidates respectively.”24 Reflecting the democratic 
traditions of the republic, Madison posited that free speech is essential to 
the sovereignty of “we, the people.” Madison’s argument reflects a modern 
sensibility: 
What will be the situation of the people? Not free; because they 
will be compelled to make their election between competitors 
whose pretensions they are not permitted by the act equally to 
examine, to discuss, and to ascertain. And from both these 
situations will not those in power derive an undue advantage for 
continuing themselves in it, which, by impairing the right of 
election, endangers the blessings of the Government founded on 
it?
25
 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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Inspired by the pleas of Madison, expressive liberty developed, but 
slowly. Law outgrew original meanings, but it took decades. After the 
Sedition Act and well into the twentieth century, state government had 
primary responsibility for defining freedom of expression. And in the few 
cases falling within federal jurisdiction, doctrine hardly did anything for the 
cause of liberty.  
One example of the prevailing doctrine in the World War I era is 
chilling. A Vermont minister mimeographed (the media of the day) a 
statement that Christ prohibited his disciples from fighting for him on the 
eve of his crucifixion; this meant that no good Christian could draw a sword 
on behalf of the city where he dwells.
26
 The minister gave that to a number 
of other ministers—a couple of old men and one young man of military age. 
He was prosecuted by the federal government for a violation of the 
Espionage Act of 1917.
27
 He was sentenced to jail for fifteen years for this 
one piece of mimeographed paper, and he served one year.
28
  
This case is illustrative of doctrine in place in America during World 
War I,
29
 and it is the type of case that inspired new academic and judicial 
theories of free expression, including the famous dissents of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes and, later, Louis Brandeis.
30
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 26. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 55–56 (1941) 
(discussing the case of Rev. Clarence H. Waldron). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 50–51. 
 30. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring) 
(“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear 
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant 
men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the 
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and 
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 44 (1969); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be 
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that 
they should be given their chance and have their way.”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Democracy: Leaving the Truth of Political Opinion to “We, the People” 
After the Sedition Act and well into the twentieth century, there was not 
much protection for free speech. Until the modern era (and well after 1937, 
the usual date for the modern era) hardly a word was heard from the courts 
to protect a broader freedom of speech.
31
 Most judges still deferred to 
democratic process and outcome.
32
 Felix Frankfurter spoke most clearly for 
judicial self-restraint even in cases presenting First Amendment claims: he 
argued free speech was not an exception to the principle of majority rule.
33
  
The evolution of federal constitutional law seemed to take a long time, 
primarily because the Court did not endorse anything remotely resembling a 
libertarian theory of free speech until the Warren Court. Only in the 
aftermath of the McCarthyism trauma, during the civil rights era and the 
1960s did courts act on a sense that they had a judicial duty to remedy 
executive, legislative, and prosecutorial abuse.
34
 The courts struggled—but 
ultimately succeeded—in developing manageable, enforceable principles to 
protect expressive liberty. The courts settled on a consensus approach that 
defined a categorical hostility to government discrimination against 
ideologies, philosophies, and viewpoints.
35
 That consensus approach is the 
foundation of the law today.  
                                                                                                                 
 31. See generally Alan Brinkley, The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 
1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005) (discussing the modern era).  
 32. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 33. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court) 
(“[I]t would be out of bounds for the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, 
provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by some explicit limitation.”); 
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 539 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Free-speech cases are not an 
exception to the principle that we are not legislators, that direct policy-making is not our 
province.”). 
 34. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing judicial 
duty). 
 35. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980). 
If . . . history . . . teaches us anything, it is that attempts to evaluate the threat 
posed by the communication of an alien view inevitably become involved with 
the ideological predispositions of those doing the evaluating, and certainly with 
the relative confidence or paranoia of the age. If the First Amendment is even 
to begin to serve its central function of assuring an open political dialogue and 
process, we must seek to minimize assessment of the dangerousness of the 
various messages people want to communicate. [When] state officials seek to 
silence a message because they think it’s dangerous, . . . we insist that the 
message fall within some clearly and narrowly bounded category of expression 
we have designated in advance as unentitled to protection.  
Id. 
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The principal case addressing falsehood and the First Amendment—and 
in so doing, defining the central meaning of the First Amendment—is New 
York Times v. Sullivan.
36
 The facts are simple and basically undisputed. 
Police Commissioner Sullivan sued the authors of a newspaper 
advertisement in the Times and the Times itself for libel.
37
 Sullivan was 
concerned about an advertisement in defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.
38
 It described the heroic efforts of Dr. King and condemned the southern 
strategies of repression.
39
 The problem was that the advertisement was 
inaccurate in several particulars: they got some dates wrong and they got 
some details about the location of events wrong.
40
 There was no specific 
reference to Police Commissioner Sullivan, but the ad contained criticism 
of the agency he led.
41
 
What was going on? Needless to say, the lawsuit reflected no desire to 
vindicate truth or fact. If Sullivan prevailed, the lawsuit would certainly 
silence the civil rights movement in Alabama as well as the newspaper that 
covered the issue; as two commentators put it, “Silence, not money, was the 
goal.”42 If the defamation judgment of the Alabama courts in Sullivan had 
been upheld—combined with other defamation actions confronting the 
Times at the time—there was reasonable fear that the greatest paper in 
America could not survive.
43
  
The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether this 
law, as applied to public criticism of public officials in the performance of 
their public duties, violated the First Amendment.
44
 In a magnificent 
                                                                                                                 
 36. 376 U.S. at 254. 
 37. Id. at 256. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 258. 
 41. Id. 
 42. GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING OF A NATION 231 (2006). 
If the [Alabama] officials could win, they would almost certainly silence the 
civil rights movement in Alabama – as well as the newspaper that consistently 
covered it. Silence, not money, was the goal. Alabama had some experience in 
forcing its opposition off the playing field. The NAACP in Alabama had been 
barred from doing business and been wiped out five years earlier; two more 
years before the ban could be lifted. 
Id. 
 43. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
35, 146 (1991). 
 44. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.  
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opinion by Justice William Brennan, the Supreme Court struck down the 
judgment and the award:  
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.
45
 
Brennan’s opinion in Sullivan is celebrated, glorified, and controversial. 
Justice Antonin Scalia proclaimed that the case was wrongly decided 
because it was inconsistent with the framers’ understanding.46 And in a real 
sense, he was probably right: the holding was quite far removed from 
original understanding. But so are the campaign finance cases;
47
 the hate 
speech cases;
48
 and the flag desecration cases.
49
 Indeed, almost all First 
Amendment doctrine is far removed from original understandings, and 
Justice Scalia supported the bulk of it.
50
 It may not be enough to be 
“originalism,” strictly speaking, but Justice Brennan’s rationale tracked the 
view of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment and the Bill of 
Rights—at least, the view of the “father of the Constitution” eleven years 
after the Philadelphia convention and seven years after ratification of the 
First Amendment. If Brennan did not draw from thinking prior to 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 270. 
 46. See JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 377–78 n.37 (2009) (“I’m critical of [Sullivan] because if 
there’s anything that is counter to originalism, it’s that. The Court made up a new libel 
law.”); John W. Dean, Justice Scalia’s Thoughts, and a Few of My Own, on New York Times 
v. Sullivan, FINDLAW (Dec. 2, 2005), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/justice-
scalias-thoughts-and-a-few-of-my-own-on-new-york-times-v-sullivan.html (“Scalia revealed 
that he felt the landmark 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan was wrong. . . . ‘I don't 
think that's what the founding fathers intended,’ Scalia said . . . .”).  
 47. See, e.g., BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 405 (2014) (discussing 
Citizens United and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Professor Murphy notes that 
Scalia “could not call upon the wisdom of the Founders” in support of his “more speech is 
better” view).  
 48. Id. at 195 (discussing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), Professor 
Murphy notes Scalia’s “willingness to protect all speech, even that which he did not like”).  
 49. Id. But see, e.g., id. at 228 (noting a case, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 
in which Justice Scalia turned away from his pattern of being “a self-proclaimed champion 
of nearly unlimited free speech,” to argue against a right to engage in anonymous 
electioneering because after searching through original historical materials, “[e]vidence that 
anonymous electioneering was regarded as a constitutional right is sparse”). 
 50. Id. 
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ratification of the First Amendment, as Scalia notes, he did rely heavily on 
political arguments of the Jeffersonian opponents of the Sedition Act, best 
articulated by James Madison in his famous “Virginia Report” of 1800.51  
In his opinion, Justice Brennan made a number of important, specific 
Madisonian observations. First, punishing falsehood alone is not enough 
justification to silence or deter public debate: “[E]rroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to 
survive.’”52 Doctrine had turned away from “any test of truth—whether 
administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and especially 
one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.”53 Protection did 
not and should not depend “upon ‘the truth, popularity, or social utility of 
the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’”54 Punishment of falsehood, even 
in defense of someone’s reputation, was not enough justification for 
suppressing public debate.
55
 And even more boldly (because no court had 
gone to this point before), proof of falsehood plus proof of damaged 
reputation plus proof of negligence (for instance, failure to verify all the 
facts in the advertisement) was not sufficient to hold the New York Times 
responsible.
56
  
The Court also embraced the Madisonian view, identified by some 
scholars as the central meaning of the First Amendment: free speech exists 
for the sake of democracy. The people’s power to govern depends upon 
their ability to judge the merits and demerits of candidates, and if 
incumbents can rig the game by preventing criticism of incumbents, the 
people’s ability to govern by free choice is threatened.57 Madison had 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Report on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 19. 
 52. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (2004)). 
 53. Id. at 271 (comparing with Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958)). 
 54. Id. (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 445). 
 55. Id. at 273.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 735 
(1963). 
If the Constitution is viewed as adopting representative government as a device 
by which the people are to govern themselves, a significant function of the 
freedom of speech clause is at once apparent. The device calls for reciprocal 
government; for the people to govern the delegated authority by which they are 
governed. This cannot work unless there is an independent popular consensus, 
protected from governmental intervention, to which the delegated authority can 
be held responsible. If the delegated authority is permitted to prescribe what 
may and may not be advocated, especially in the realm of political theory and 
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emphasized the link between free expression and representative 
government:  
[T]he right of electing the members of the Government [is] the 
essence of a free and responsible government. The value and 
efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the 
comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public 
trust, and on the equal freedom, of consequently, examining and 
discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates 
respectively.”58  
The Court’s opinion made the same point:  
Earlier, in a debate in the House of Representatives, Madison 
had said: “If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, 
we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the 
Government, and not in the Government over the people.” . . . 
The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public 
officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of 
the American form of government.
59
 
America cherishes free speech primarily as a way to preserve democratic 
influence over republican institutions. 
An Illustrative Story: Pursuing “Lies” After Campaigns 
Every case is also a story. One little-known, little-noted case, Chavez v. 
Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law,
60
 illustrates the need to leave 
controversies about the truth or falsity of opinion to the judgment of the 
voters. In 1978, California courts considered a lawsuit brought by the 
heroic, legendary leader of California farm workers who had campaigned 
for “Proposition 14,” a statewide initiative on the ballot in November 
                                                                                                                 
policy, then, pro tanto, it is no longer responsible to a popular will independent 
of its own, but to a reflection of its own will. The people can still select, at the 
ballot box, those by whom they are to be governed, but they can no longer 
govern through them. The government may still be representative in form, but 
self-government is not its substance. 
Id.; see also, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
 58. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 275 n.15. 
 59. Id. at 275. 
 60. 148 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Ct. App. 1978). 
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1976.
61
 Proposition 14 would have allowed union organizers to access 
private property to speak to farm workers. Farm owners opposed the 
measure.
62
 Their political argument used ordinary rhetoric of a political 
character: Proposition 14 was an attack on the “rights” of farm owners.63 
Chavez and allies cried “foul” and “smear.”64 The people rejected the 
initiative by a large margin. Chavez and allies went to court to relitigate and 
vindicate their defeated argument. 
Chavez and his allies pointed out—accurately—that a labor law creating 
access rights for union organizers did not violate constitutional rights.
65
 
After the new jurisprudence of the “New Deal” era, property could be the 
subject of reasonable regulation for a variety of reasons. For their part, the 
farm owners pointed out—also accurately—that without some sort of 
legally mandated access, a property owner has the “right” to bar unwelcome 
persons from private property.
66
 A law that creates such access diminishes 
the otherwise rightful power of the owner over their own property.
67
  
The argument was a clash between competing accuracies, competing 
oversimplifications, and competing claims of lies. It was a classic issue 
about which reasonable minds have differed throughout the history of our 
republic. Debating our “rights” is the real national pastime. Arguments 
fashioned in the rhetoric of rights as arguments for rights dominated the 
push for national independence, for and against slavery, for and against 
civil rights laws in the nineteenth century and again in the mid-twentieth 
century. The problem is that voters and citizens do not always think like 
lawyers and they do not speak of their “rights” in precise legal terms. 
Another problem is that the legal definition of “rights” changes, sometimes 
quite dramatically.  
The Chavez plaintiffs took the unusual position that the farm owners 
“lied,” because argument against the initiative did not reflect current federal 
constitutional law or current state law.
68
 They sought money damages to 
compensate for campaign costs suffered because of the “lies.”69 There were 
several elementary problems with the doomed theory of the Chavez 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. at 279. 
 62. Full disclosure requires that the author of this Essay state that he was a junior 
member of the legal team representing the farm owners. 
 63. Chavez, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 280. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
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plaintiffs. The farm owners’ campaign arguments against the Proposition 
were statements of opinion, not fact. The arguments focused genuine issues 
of legitimate public concern. And all arguments for and against Proposition 
14 were political expression. Pure politics. Ordinary politics. For better or 
worse, it was the ordinary stuff of democracy. 
In this long-forgotten case, many of the ideas polarizing debate today can 
be observed. There was passion and many accusations of lying and 
alternative facts. There was anger and concern about the imbalance in 
campaign spending: the rich versus the poor. There was an unspoken but 
obvious lack of confidence in the ability of the voters to sort out truth 
versus falsehood. The Chavez plaintiffs were trying to prove that they did 
not deserve to lose the political debate. And if they succeeded, it might 
have been a first chapter in a new regime of government and judicial 
regulation of political argument measured against a standard of “truth” and 
“fact.” The law might have become a source of endless struggle embodied 
in intrusive, restrictive election codes. Virtually every campaign in 
California and throughout the nation would entail expensive re-litigation. 
The California trial court dismissed the claims of the Chavez plaintiffs in 
an appropriately summary fashion.
70
 The California Court of Appeal 
rejected the arguments of the Chavez plaintiffs.
71
 The judges offered a brief 
opinion with a straightforward explanation. Chavez was not a landmark 
case, because so few losing candidates and losing causes seek remedies in 
the courts. The judges knew this: “There [were] only a few published cases 
where a plaintiff seeks damages for fraudulent misrepresentation in a 
political campaign.”72 But the opinion is consistent with oft-quoted 
elements of celebrated Supreme Court pronouncements. First, as the judges 
agreed, “[t]he basic issue in this case is whether we are dealing with a 
statement of fact or an opinion.” 73 The distinction was decisive, because 
“courts apply the Constitution by carefully distinguishing between 
statements of opinion and fact, treating the one as constitutionally protected 
and imposing on the other civil liability for its abuse.”74 Second, the 
appropriate treatment of the case was guided by the overriding goal “to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”75 Third, “[t]he Constitution, and 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 279. 
 71. Id. at 282.  
 72. Id. at 280. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 281 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1987)). 
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public policy, require open public debate on initiative issues without the 
‘chilling’ effect of legal reprisals.”76 
Our courts do not entertain litigation over truth or falsehood in election 
campaigns. The strikingly small number of attempts is a symptom of a core 
idea—influenced most by the rationale in New York Times v. Sullivan: 
government agencies, including courts, are not permitted to measure the 
arguments of any advocate in the electoral arena against some idealized—
and no doubt flawed—standard of truth and accuracy. 
The First Amendment and the Sovereignty of the People 
If the nation is suffering a stress test, it should surprise no one that First 
Amendment doctrine is also challenged and tested. In the dissenting 
opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis, eloquent and inspiring words 
articulate reasons why freedom of expression is important, fundamental, 
and deserving of special protection.
77
 One of the most famous arguments 
points toward a kind of intellectual Darwinism in which facts and the 
strongest ideas survive.
78
 Belief in the unregulated marketplace of ideas, as 
influentially described by Justice Holmes, is still widely quoted, though 
perhaps not so widely believed:
79
  
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express 
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when 
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired 
is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their wishes safely can be carried out.
80
 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 630. 
 79. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 5 (“The American experiment, the original 
embodiment of the great Enlightenment idea of intellectual freedom, every individual free to 
believe anything she wishes, has metastasized out of control. . . . In America those more 
exciting parts of the Enlightenment idea have swamped the sober, rational, empirical 
parts.”). 
 80. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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The “old faith” underlying our commitment to expressive liberty rests on 
the judgment that some basics are “common ground.” For example, 
“[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. 
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not 
on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas.”81 Our nation will do no better if it tries—through legislation and 
judicial decree—to hold political rhetoric to standards of “fairness,” or 
“accuracy,” or government-prescribed “truth.” We will have no more 
wisdom—and considerably less freedom—if government agencies, 
including courts, begin to measure political arguments in the electoral arena 
against some idealized, and no doubt flawed, standard of truth and 
accuracy.  
It may seem odd or strange now, but for many years, the legal profession 
confronted cases resting on case-by-case assessments of gain and pain, cost 
and benefit, advantages of liberty versus threats to order. “Ad hoc 
balancing” seemed inevitable and dominant, and so lawyers wrestled with 
doubts about whether the First Amendment was really law, or merely a 
label attached to a process that lacked any real rules.
82
 Today, such doubt 
sounds strange because a categorical approach emerged. Learned Hand had 
criticized the Holmes clear and present danger test, because he preferred “a 
qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade. If it could 
become sacred by the incrustations of time and precedent, it might be made 
to serve just a little to withhold the torrents of passion.”83 Hand did not live 
to see the full impact of his observation,
84
 but the collective work of the 
federal judiciary sought a more coherent and more conceptual First 
Amendment, because “balancing” seemed to be a subjective, unpredictable 
process. The controversy once divided Justice Frankfurter from Justice 
Black.
85
 More recently, ideologies have shuffled: a categorical approach 
was championed by Justice Brennan and Scalia, while flexibility was 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974). 
 82. Compare Frantz, supra note 57, with Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the 
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); see also 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, MORALITY OF CONSENT 57 (1975) (“The rights which the First 
Amendment creates cannot be established by any theoretical definition, as Burke said of the 
rights of man, but are in ‘balance between differences of good, in compromises sometimes 
between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil.’ . . . The First Amendment is 
no coherent theory that points our way to unambiguous decisions . . . .”). 
 83. Learned Hand, REASON AND IMAGINATION – THE SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE OF 
LEARNED HAND 103 (Constance Jordan ed. 2013). 
 84. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND JUDGE 169, 603 (1994). 
 85. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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thought to be a virtue, at least in the view of Justice Stevens
86
 and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.
87
 If there is common ground in that overextended and 
overemphasized debate, it is in the consensus surrounding New York Times 
v. Sullivan.  
It may be also be found in the careful workmanship of Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II in Cohen v. California.
88
 The facts of the case seem 
trivial. An angry draft protester wore a jacket with a prominent, profane 
epithet in the Los Angeles County Courthouse; as a result, he was arrested 
and convicted for disturbing the peace.
89
 The Harlan opinion is a useful 
toolkit for a variety of First Amendment problems, but it also spoke to first 
principles and an old faith. In his view, the states lack a general power to 
“maintain . . . a suitable level of discourse within the body politic.”90 
Endorsing the emerging categorical approach, the Harlan analysis held that 
states have legitimate reasons to act only when expression falls within the 
“various established exceptions” to the “usual rule that government bodies 
may not prescribe the form or content of individual expression.”91 The 
principles serve a central purpose. They “remove governmental restraints 
from the arena of public discussion” so that ideas and information will flow 
freely “in the hope that the use of such freedom will ultimately produce a 
more capable citizenry.”92 From Madison to Brennan to Harlan comes the 
idea that doctrine must serve democracy.  
At least, that is, when a case involves political speech on matters of 
public interest, including elections, government regulation is restricted. As 
the Court wrote in Mills v. Alabama: 
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First 
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a 
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes 
                                                                                                                 
 86. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), Justice Stevens wrote one of his 
opinions designed to question the categorical approach, because it “sacrifices subtlety for 
clarity and is, I am convinced, ultimately unsound. As an initial matter, the concept of 
‘categories’ fits poorly with the complex reality of expression. Few dividing lines in First 
Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give 
rise only to fuzzy boundaries.” Id. at 426. 
 87. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 88. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 89. Id. at 16–17. 
 90. Id. at 23. 
 91. Id. at 24. 
 92. Id. 
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discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, 
the manner in which government is operated or should be 
operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
93
 
The viewpoints, philosophies, and substantive ideas of those who 
participate in the political process are not subject to the scrutiny or 
punishment of any governmental agency based on notions of fact or truth. If 
plaintiffs genuinely seek to reduce the amount of falsehood in campaign 
rhetoric, their only recourse is to rebuttal, to enter the marketplace of ideas, 
to appeal to the good judgment of voters whose will is supposed to be 
sovereign.  
The concept of fraud is not easily translated from the context of 
commercial advertising to political argument. In Virginia Pharmacy Board 
v. Virginia Consumer Council,
94
 Justice Potter Stewart offered a concurring 
opinion that explained “the important differences” between commercial 
speech and ideological communication: 
 The Court’s determination that commercial advertising of the 
kind at issue here is not ‘wholly outside the protection of the 
First Amendment indicates by its very phrasing that there are 
important differences between commercial price and product 
advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on 
the other. Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or 
theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of thought—
thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of 
man. Although such expression may convey factual information 
relevant to social and individual decisionmaking, it is protected 
by the Constitution, whether or not it contains factual 
representations and even if it includes inaccurate assertions of 
fact. Indeed, disregard of the ‘truth’ may be employed to give 
force to the underlying idea expressed by the speaker. . . . 
 Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly 
from ideological expression because it is confined to the 
promotion of specific goods or services. The First Amendment 
protects the advertisement because of the “information of 
potential interest and value” conveyed, rather than because of 
any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas. Since the 
factual claims contained in commercial price or product 
                                                                                                                 
 93. 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966). 
 94. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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advertisements relate to tangible goods or services, they may be 
tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth without in 
any manner jeopardizing the free dissemination of thought. 
Indeed, the elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to 
promote the one facet of commercial price and product 
advertising that warrants First Amendment protection—its 
contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable information 
relevant to public and private decisionmaking.
95
  
Our past is messy—filled with conspiracy theories, nightmare fantasies, 
whitewashing myths, historical amnesia and misunderstandings, bigotry, 
ignorance, and partisan lies. Our law—in the past half-century at least—is 
dedicated to the idea that the messiness is a symptom of freedom, and that 
freedom serves self-government. Worries may be reasonable and 
understandable,
96
 but Justice Harlan spoke for the dominant view of the 
legal profession, which sees the First Amendment as an expression of 
confidence. “That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony 
is . . . not a sign of weakness but of strength.”97 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 779–81 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes and internal citations omitted). 
 96. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 449, 449–50 (1985). 
[T]he overriding objective at all times should be to equip the first amendment 
to do maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of 
unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and 
most likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other 
words, should be targeted for the worst of times. 
Id. 
 97. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25. 
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